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Abstract 
This short article attempts to find and highlight the most important 
reasons that determined the deterioration of the international imagine of the 
communist regime from Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania. Although after 1968, 
- the year when the Romanian leader publicly condemned Czechoslovakia’s 
invasion by the Red Army- Romania’s image in the Western countries was 
very good, during the 80s the whole capital of sympathy completely 
disappeared. Nicolae Ceausescu’s anti-Soviet foreign policy made him a so-
called “spoiled child” of the West. In 1989, the Romanian dictator remained 
the only Stalinist leader from European countries, paradoxically an anti-Soviet 
Stalinist leader. 
In our opinion there were three very important events that determined the 
irreversible degradation of the regime’s image abroad: Helsinki Final Act in 
1975; General Ion Mihai Pacepa’s (vice-leader of Foreign Information 
Department of Romanian Intelligence) run to the USA and last but not the 
least, Mikhail Gorbachev’s election as general secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. (CPSU) We started from the hypothesis that these 
three moments were somehow decisive for Ceausescu’s decline in the eyes of 
his own people and mainly in international relations. From methodological 
point of view we tried to explain briefly how and in what measure the three 
mentioned events and their consequences changed maybe irreversibly the 
image of Romanian dictator mainly abroad. We tried also to make a short 
comparison between Ceausescu’s situation in 1968 and his position in the 
1980’s. We could conclude that evolution of the events confirmed that one of 
the most important blows for Romanian dictator was Gorbachev’s election. 
However we do not need to overrate this aspect. The international and regional 
context at the end of 1980’s was decisive. The end of the Cold War and 
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refolutions from Central and Eastern Europe made impossible the survival of 
the last Stalinist regime.  
 
Keywords: Nicolae Ceausescu, Mikhail Gorbachev, neo-stalinism, foreign 
policy, paradox. 
 
Introduction. A few methodological aspects 
Did George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, the most powerful men of 
the planet, decide at the beginning of December 1989, with the occasion of the 
meeting in Malta on “Maxim Gorki” ship, to get rid of Nicolae Ceauşescu? At 
that moment, Ceausescu remained the last and the only one Stalinist of Europe. 
(For the communist regime, Nicolae Ceauseascu’s era, see among others, 
Gorun A., 2012: 108-79; Shafir, 1985; Jowitt, 1971; Burakowski, 2011; 
Deletant, 1997; Tismaneanu, 2005; Kunze, 2002;  Gabanyi, 2003; Georgescu, 
1992; Campeanu, 2002; Pacepa, 1993). 
Perhaps a definitive elucidation of this thorny issue will only occur 
when a declassification of several archive documents will be made. And maybe 
not even then. Why? Because any document issued by a certain authority 
contains only the information that authority wants to leave behind for posterity. 
That document is a materialisation of the power’s discourse. Moreover, a 
priori, one cannot talk about objectivity in history. There is only subjectivity, 
which can be good subjectivity or bad subjectivity (Gorun G., 2008: 116-10). 
We could conclude there is no true objectivity in humanities and social 
sciences. Starting from this premise, we attempted to make a short analysis of 
Nicolae Ceausescu’s foreign policy. We took into consideration particularly 
the main reasons, which in our opinion determined the degradation of the 
international image and finally the complete isolation of the regime. From 
methodological point of view we tried to explain briefly how and in what 
measure three international events and their consequences changed maybe 
irreversibly the image of Romanian dictator mainly abroad. We think about 
Helsinki Final Act in 1975, General Ion Mihai Pacepa’s run to the USA and 
last but not the least, Mikhail Gorbachev’s election as general secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We tried to find the significance and to 
explain why each of these events represented a real political blow for the 
dictator of Bucharest. In our opinion the consequences of the last event 
(Gorbachev’s election) was among the most important cause for Ceausescu’s 
“regime” collapse. 
We attempted also to make a short comparison between the situation 
of the Romanian leader in 1968 and his position in the 1980’s. We strived to 
identify the main reason for which the popularity level of Ceausescu’s regime 
decreased so much. In the year 1968, in August, Romanian leader was at the 
apogee of his popularity in Romania and in international relations as well. Due 
European Scientific Journal October 2018 edition Vol.14, No.29 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
 
77 
to his courageous attitude towards Kremlin, the Western powers perceived 
somehow Romanian leader as a kind of a new Iosip Broz Tito.  
 
Several considerations about the nature of Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime 
 Nicolae Ceausescu gradually became, especially in the second half 
of the 1980s, an undesirable leader for both the United States and Kremlin. The 
huge capital of popularity and sympathy, acquired by the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party after 1968 [when not only that he declined Romania's 
involvement in the invasion of Czechoslovakia (Retegan, 1998) but, moreover, 
he publicly condemned the aggression] began to evaporate progressively.The 
anti- Sovietism policy carried out consistently, will become obsolete. We must 
mention that Nicolae Ceauşescu will adopt a completely different attitude in 
1989 when he insisted for a force intervention of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization in Poland and Hungary, where internal political developments 
threatened the fate of socialism. 
 A paradox of Ceauşescu's politics, rightly pointed out by the political 
scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu (Tismaneanu, 2005: 260-223), is that even 
though an anti-Soviet leader until the end in his foreign policy, internally, the 
Romanian leader turned out to be a fervent Stalinist. In fact, an anti-Soviet 
Stalinist. We could say then in the eyes of his own people Nicolae Ceausescu 
evolved or better said involved from “the most beloved son” to the “the most 
hated” man in Romania. Nicolae Ceausescu’s neo-stalinism became obvious 
especially in 1980’s, although we could perceive the first signs even after 1971, 
the year when he visited Mao Zedong’s China and North Korea. After that he 
bagan a kind of “cultural revolution”, following Chinese pattern. During 
1980’s the most draconian measures were implemented because the dictator 
intended to pay all the external debt of the Romanian state. In this way, he 
wanted to affirm Romania’s independence in international affairs. 
Unfortunately the costs and the sacrifices of the Romanian population were 
huge. The lack of food, of the goods absolutely necessary for survival, the 
interruption of electricity supply and a lot of other unpopular measures made 
Nicolae Ceausescu a dictator and a tyrant in the eyes of his own people. After 
August 1968, the situation was totally different. The people loved and 
appreciated him as a great leader. In 1980’s, only some high ranking officials 
party (the so-called nomenklatura) and a part of Securitate (the secret political 
police) really supported him. They were among very few categories that 
enjoyed wealth and privileges. 
Some historians have spoken of the practice of a terror for prophylactic 
reasons, or of a non-terrorist neo-Stalinism (Deletant, 2006: 266-180). Indeed, 
the intensity of physical terror has diminished compared to the Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej era, but the psychic terror was exerted in the "Golden Age", 
with few active opponents, such as Vasile Paraschiv. These opponents had 
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been subjected to psychiatric "treatments". In fact, the diabolical goal was to 
reduce the "patient" to the so-called vegetable condition. 
 
From Helsinki Final Act to the election of the Reformer Mihail Gorbachev 
as General Secretary of the CPSU 
In our opinion, at least three significant international events caused 
gradual decline of the Ceauşescu’s regime and ultimately international 
isolation and, implicitly, its collapse (Gorun H., 2012: 220-215). We do not 
emphasize here internal realities such as the serious deterioration of the 
Romanians' living conditions since the end of the 70s (worsening caused by 
the obduracy with which the dictator was holding to the death to pay foreign 
debt), the systematization program, the omnipresence and the omnipotence of 
political police, control over privacy (Kligman, 2000) etc.. 
The first event: Helsinki Final Act (Securitatea si cooperarea in 
Europa. Documente 1972-1989, 1991) in 1975, with its basket concerning 
human rights. In principle, the international community could supervise the 
respect of the human rights in communist countries from Europe and exert 
pressures on Ceausescu’s “regime”.  But the Bucharest authorities used the 
non-interference principle in the internal affairs of states in order to circumvent 
this provision. This principle allowed them to flagrantly violate fundamental 
rights and freedoms. The sovereignty principle was used by Romanian leader 
in his well-known speeches pronounced in August 1968 and in December 
1989. In fact, nationalism was one of the main features of his policy. But the 
internal and mainly external contexts were completely different in 1989. The 
foreign policy process depends upon some elements such as the type, the nature 
of the political regimes. Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania was a totalitarian 
communist state. In a non-democratic regime, the only one real foreign policy 
decision maker is the dictator himself. Moreover, the leader of Bucharest was 
known for some paranoid tendencies. So the whole politics of the state (here 
included foreign policy) was headed by him. He established all foreign policy 
objectives and adopted the essential decisions. Thus we could say that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had only a formal, decorative role. In 1968, 
Nicolae Ceausescu valorized an important event of the international relations. 
Condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia he took advantages from an 
external event in order to strengthen his internal position and abroad 
popularity. Since 1968, Romanian leader has remained loyal to autonomous 
policy towards Moscow. 
In 1978 however, a second major event took place. The General Ion 
Mihai Pacepa (Pacepa,1992) [vice-leader of Foreign Information Department 
of Romanian Intelligence] left Romania for United States of America. This 
“act of treachery” in favor of the “American imperialists” affected Nicolae 
Ceauşescu and unsettled a lot Romanian Securitate. Pacepa's book, Orizonturi 
European Scientific Journal October 2018 edition Vol.14, No.29 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
 
79 
rosii [Red Horizons], arrived later on President Ronald Reagan's desk. Very 
interested, the president read it and spoke a memorable statement: "This will 
be my Bible (my handbook) in relations with communist dictators" (Kunze, 
2002: 428). 
The authorities from Bucharest were optimistic after the Republican 
Reagan won the presidential elections in November 1980, because they were 
convinced that Republicans loved Romania, since Richard Nixon and Gerald 
Ford had visited Ceausescu (Ibidem: 418-415). 
What is right, Reagan's vice-president, George Bush met Romanian 
president in Bucharest, but the international realities in the early 1980s were 
still somehow favorable to Ceausescu. The U. S. -Soviet bilateral relations had 
deteriorated rapidly following the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan 
in December 1979, the second Cold War being underway. For these reasons, 
the U.S. Vice-President at that time had a rather positive attitude towards 
Ceausescu, praising him for his independent tendencies towards Moscow. The 
communist leader of Bucharest tried to maintain his image of disobedient 
leader towards Kremlin and thus to improve the relations with Washington and 
obtain economic aid.   
But after 1985, the international context no longer evolved in the favor 
of Romania’s leader (Gorun H. , 2012: 218). The third and perhaps the most 
important event was the election of the reformer Mikhail Sergheevici 
Gorbachev as General Secretary of the C.P.S.U. The appointment of the future 
architect of glasnost and perestroika in that position generated the gradual 
improvement of relations between Kremlin and Washington. The two world 
superpowers have passed from confrontation to cooperation, from fear and 
threats to dialogue and negotiation (Gaddis, 2009). For the United States and 
the whole West, the position of independence or extended autonomy towards 
the Soviet Union had become anachronical. Ceausescu continued to maintain 
this policy in order to disagree with Gorbachev and show his opposition to 
genuine internal reforms. It is obvious that he intended to impose a Stalinist 
internal policy. And the relations of Romanian leader with Gorbachev 
(Burakowski, 2011: 338-326) have been strained all over the nearly five years 
(since 1985 to December 1989). The leader of Kremlin wanted to reform 
communism. He was sure that reforms could save the communist system. He 
denounced Stalinism, but he has always appealed to Marxism-Leninism. On 
the other hand, Romanian dictator was aware that communism could not be 
reformed. Trying to reform communism means the dissolution of the system. 
The reform is not compatible with a totalitarian, monolithic regime. So, the 
relations between a reformist and a conservative communist could not 
improve, but they worsened. Ceausescu was also angry because the general 
secretary of CPSU represented one of the causes for the degradation of 
relations with US.. 
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Romania’s complete isolation in the last years of communism. Did Mikhail 
Gorbachev and George Bush discuss in Malta about Ceausescu’s 
removal? 
To Nicolae Ceausescu may be reproached a kind of political autism, 
remaining faithful to a political line that had brought him praise all over the 
world more than 15 years ago. But after 1985, and even more in the year 1989, 
the reality was quite different. The Socialist Republic of Romania was 
internationally isolated; the only states with which the regime from Bucharest 
still had good relations were North Korea, Cuba, People’s Republic of China 
and the countries from the third world. 
In 1989, the wind of change (to paraphrase a famous song by German 
band Scorpions) was blowing more and more strongly in the Central European 
states. In Socialist Republic of Romania, the "Golden Age" and the Leader 
were living their last months. "Refolutions" (Garton Ash, 1999: 14-13) as the 
political scientist and sociologist Timothy Garton Ash called them, in his book 
The Magic Lantern [namely popular movements, immediately followed by 
extensive reform programs or concurrently with them] succeeded in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall, the 
symbol of Europe’s and world’s division, collapsed. The refractories Erich 
Honecker, in the German Democratic Republic, and Todor Jivkov, in Bulgaria, 
had been removed. Thus, as the historian Dumitru Preda pointed out, 
everything was meant to be carried out in accordance with the principle of 
domino (Preda, Retegan, 2000). 
 Nicolae Ceauşescu, however, was acting in another film, in which he 
wanted to be at the same time director and actor. Still, in the summer of 1989, 
in an interview with an American journalist, he declared himself an admirer of 
Iosif Vissarionovici Stalin (Evenimentul Zilei, 2009). Moreover, he welcomed 
the bloody repression measures of the demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square 
by the Communist power of Beijing. He cynically commented: "the duty of the 
students is to learn, and that of the government is to keep order" (Ibidem). 
Ceauşescu's clinging to power in his last days is therefore explicable, even if 
we only consider this statement. His attitude was ultimately fatal. 
 At the end of this article, we return to the question in the first 
paragraph. The opinions are divided. Alex Mihai Stoenescu referred to a 
bargaining between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta (Stoenescu, 2009; Idem, 
2005; Cartianu, 2010). 
The Soviet leader would have given free hand for a U.S. intervention 
in Panama to remove General Manuel Noriega’s corrupt regime. Instead, the 
Soviet Union would have had a free hand on Romania. The Head of the State 
Security Department, Iulian Vlad, is considered to have informed the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party about the decision of superpower leaders to 
get rid of him. Moreover, in favor of the A.M. Stoenescu’s valorisation it 
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pleads the insistence with that the Party’s official newspaper, Scinteia, has 
published - after the outbreak of the Romanian Revolution in Timişoara - 
information about the realities of Panama. The articles condemned the 
interference of the great powers in the affairs of small states, the violation of 
the sovereignty and independence of the latter. Shortly after the Gorbachev-
Bush meeting in Malta, Ceausescu visited Moscow, and in a discussion with 
the Soviet leader, the Romanian president proposed that the discussion and 
solving of some problems be postponed to January 1990. The answer of the 
General Secretary of the USSR it remains very enigmatic: "Let us live by 
January 9..." (Sandulescu, 1996 : 292; Kunze, 2002: 458-456). 
Yet the Americans Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott in At the 
Highest Levels. Inside Story of the End of the Cold War, have denied the idea 
that in Malta, Bush and Gorbachev would have set up the fate of Romania. 
(Beschloss, Talbott, 1993) The two scholars argued that the superpowers were 
less interested in small powers, the roles of the latter being insignificant in the 
international policy strategies of the former. Moreover, the two leaders, that of 
the White House and that of Kremlin, would have publicly declared that they 
did not discuss about Romania between December 2 and December 3, 1989. 
(Ibidem) 
However, it is not without significance that before Nicolae and Elena 
Ceausescu being executed on December 25, 1989, the United States of 
America would have tried to offer political asylum to the two. Significant 
personalities of American political life, such as George Schultz, Secretary of 
State during Ronald Reagan's administration, and Henry Kissinger, former 
Richard Nixon's national security adviser, insisted on political asylum. In the 
summer of 1989, Ceausescu, at the George Bush’s insistence agreed to give up 
capital punishment in respect to the diplomat Mircea Raceanu. The latter had 
been told that he had committed espionage in favor of the United States 
(Cartianu, 2010). 
 In December 1989, the desire of some American circles to save the 
Romanian dictator can also be seen as a reward for his leniency gesture made 
a few months ago. The neo-communist regime in Bucharest, however, 
categorically rejected the American proposal. 
 
Conclusion 
 The three reasons mentioned in this short paper determined the 
international deterioration of Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime and also weakened 
its position. In our opinion, Mikhail Gorbachev’s election as head of Soviet 
Communist Party represents probably the fondamental cause. However, we do 
not have to overrate this aspect. We need to take into consideration the 
international context in the late 1980’s, the improvement of the bilateral 
relations between Moscow and Washington and, as a consequence, the end of 
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the ideological conflict. The Cold War will be over soon. The regional 
circumstances in Central and Eastern Europe are also very important and we 
must take them into account. Kremlin had decided to replace Brezhnev’s 
doctrine of the limited sovreignity with so-called Sinatra Doctrine. Thus, the 
countries from Soviet sphere were able to choose their own ways and to build 
their own destinies. Gorbachev’s peretroika and glasnost were perceived like 
a signal by them. So the refolutions from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
will weaken and later determine the collapse of communism. It was practically 
impossible for Romanian communist regime to maintain a positive 
international image and to survive. An island of totalitarian communism could 
not survive being surrounded by states with democratic regimes. The domino 
principle was a reality. On the other hand, Nicolae Ceausescu’s foreign policy 
was a  paradoxical one. He turned to be a fervent Stalinist in internal affairs in 
order to consolidate his regime. At the same time, Romanian dictator remained 
loyal to his anti-Soviet attitude. He continued to follow this line in foreign 
policy even when it became obvious that it had become obsolete and 
catastrophic for him.  
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